Davidson was Almost Right about Lying

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353 (2013)

Authors
Don Fallis
Northeastern University
Abstract
Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ?must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not?. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition
Keywords Lying  Conceptual Analysis  Donald Davidson
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Reprint years 2013
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2012.688980
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References found in this work BETA

Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Common Ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying and Knowing.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.
Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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