Synthese 98 (3):379 - 399 (1994)

When I engage in some routine activity, it will usually be the case that I mean or intend the present move to be followed by others. What does meaning the later moves consist in? How do I know, when I come to perform them, that they were what I meant? Problems familiar from Wittgenstein's and Kripke's discussions of linguistic meaning arise here. Normally, I will not think of the later moves. But, even if I do, there are reasons to deny that thinking of them can constitute what it is to mean to perform them. I argue that the problem can be solved, in the case of routine action, by the notion that our behavioural routines are guided by what I callmodest agent memory. It will help explain both how wecan have future moves in mind and how we can be in a position to avow the fact.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063926
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Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.
Elbow Room.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):423-425.

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