Epistemic value theory and information ethics

Minds and Machines 14 (1):101-117 (2004)
Abstract
Three of the major issues in information ethics – intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy – concern the morality of restricting people’s access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill, 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection with epistemology. In this paper, I illustrate how a value-theoretic approach to epistemology can help to clarify these major issues in information ethics. However, I also identify several open questions about epistemic values that need to be answered before we will be able to evaluate the epistemic consequences of many information policies
Keywords epistemic value theory   epistemology   information ethics   intellectual property   philosophy of information   privacy   social epistemology   speech regulation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:MIND.0000005138.57370.df
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,798
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Account of Privacy.Martijn Blaauw - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):167-177.
Collective Epistemic Goals.Don Fallis - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.
The Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Collaboration.Don Fallis - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):197-208.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
86 ( #63,027 of 2,199,759 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #300,203 of 2,199,759 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature