Episteme 2 (1):39-55 (2005)
The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Dependence in Interdisciplinary Groups.Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht - 2013 - Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
Similar books and articles
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction.Christian List - 2012 - In Uskali Mäki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier.
Belief Merging, Judgment Aggregation and Some Links with Social Choice Theory.Gabriella Pigozzi - manuscript
Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):209-221.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #89,380 of 2,172,663 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,028 of 2,172,663 )
How can I increase my downloads?