Episteme 2 (1):39-55 (2005)

Authors
Don Fallis
Northeastern University
Abstract
The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments.
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.39
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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Citations of this work BETA

Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
The Value of Knowledge.Carter J. Adam, Pritchard Duncan & Turri John - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Value of Knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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