Incommensurability and measurement

Theoria 12 (3):467-491 (1997)
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Abstract

Does incommensurability threaten the realist’s claim that physical magnitudes express properties of natural kinds? Some clarification comes from measurement theory and scientific practice. The standard (empiricist) theory of measurement is metaphysically neutral. But its representational operational and axiomatic aspects give rise to several kinds of a one-sided metaphysics. In scientific practice. the scales of physical quantities (e.g. the mass or length scale) are indeed constructed from measuring methods which have incompatible axiomatic foundations. They cover concepts which belong to incomensurable theories. I argue, however, that the construction of such scales conmmits us to a modest version of scientific realism

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reprint Falkenburg, Brigitte (1997) "Incommensurability and Measurement". Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 12(3):467-491

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Citations of this work

Pragmatic Unification, Observation and Realism in Astroparticle Physics.Brigitte Falkenburg - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (2):327-345.
Functions of Intution in Quantum Physics.Brigitte Falkenburg - 2006 - In Emily Carson & Renate Huber, Intuition and the Axiomatic Method. Springer. pp. 267--292.
La referencia del término de magnitud física "Masa".Ana Fleisner - 2012 - Páginas de Filosofía (Universidad Nacional del Comahue) 13 (16):5-25.

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