A Defense of Dogmatism

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57 (2013)
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Abstract

Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters is true if you can have knowledge about controversial matters. That’s because, when it comes to a belief about a controversial matter, there could easily be an apparently sound argument that the belief is false. But, often, if your knowledge can withstand this fact (which it can, the literature on disagreement notwithstanding), then it can withstand your discovering the apparently sound argument and finding it apparently sound.

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Jeremy Fantl
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

In defence of epistemic vices.Steven Bland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-22.
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Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.

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