Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge

Episteme 9 (1):27-42 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough to be a reason one has for believing other things.

Similar books and articles

Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Jie Gao - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Practical Reasons.Anne Baril - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Feminist Epistemology.Robin McKenna - 2020 - In Natalie Alana Ashton, Robin McKenna, Katharina Anna Sodoma & Martin Kusch (eds.), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism. Routledge.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.
Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment.Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8:96-117.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-09

Downloads
133 (#34,792)

6 months
312 (#67,135)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jeremy Fantl
University of Calgary
Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.
Kierkegaard on belief and credence.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):394-412.
Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.
Science, values, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Boaz Miller - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
Hoping for Metanormative Realism.Anne Jeffrey - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):1-15.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 10 references / Add more references