Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2018)

Authors
Jeremy Fantl
University of Calgary
Abstract
When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers.
Keywords Knowledge, disagreement, social epistemology, engagement
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $60.00 used (6% off)   $64.00 new   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 0198807953   9780198807957
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.

View all 187 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences.Galen Barry - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):52-76.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Defense of Dogmatism.Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
Open‐Mindedness as Engagement.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):70-86.
Environmental Public Participation in the UK.Hinrich Voss - 2014 - International Journal of Social Quality 4 (1):26-40.
Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-06-01

Total views
1,862 ( #1,860 of 2,433,501 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
166 ( #3,462 of 2,433,501 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes