Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200 (2015)

Authors
Katalin Farkas
Central European University
Abstract
Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis
Keywords extended mind  analysis of knowledge  extended cognition  knowledge first
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2010 - Routledge.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Know-Wh Does Not Reduce to Know That.Katalin Farkas - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122.
Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.
Knowledge Requires Belief – and It Doesn’T? On Belief as Such and Belief Necessary for Knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167.
Against Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.

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