In David Braddon-Mitchell & Peter Anstey (eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford, UK: (forthcoming)

Authors
Katalin Farkas
Central European University
Abstract
In this chapter, I revisit the issue of the explanatory gap that is supposed to open when considering identity statements between physical and mental phenomena. I show that the question asked in the original formulation of the explanatory gap was this: ʻwhy this phenomenal character, rather than any other, is attached to this physiological process?ʼ I argue that this question can be answered, because there is a natural fit between the phenomenal character of experiences and their functional roles. For example, pains feel inherently unpleasant, and that explains why they cause avoidance behaviour, and the felt location and intensity of pain indicates the location and extent of damage to the body. I discuss some other possible gaps in our understanding the relationship between the mental and the physical, and conclude that the fit between functional role and phenomenal character goes a long way, though probably not the whole way, to closing the explanatory gap.
Keywords explanatory gap  functionalism  mind-body problem  phenomenal functionalism  quality space  primary and secondary qualities  inverted qualia  materialism  physicalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Sensory Qualities.Austen Clark - 1992 - Clarendon Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap.Clyde L. Hardin - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.
Functionalism and Qualia.Kalevi Lehto - 2003 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
Functionalism and Sensations.Mark Brown - 1983 - Auslegung 10:218-28.
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
Sensory Holism and Functionalism.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):972-973.
Quality-Space Functionalism About Color.Jacob Berger - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (3):138-164.
Testing Robots for Qualia.James H. Moor - 1988 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kim's Functionalism.Marian David - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:133-48.
Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities.Janet Levin - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):400-411.
Qualia.David Villena Saldaña - 2016 - Escritura y Pensamiento 39 (39):79-103.
Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-07-06

Total views
45 ( #235,976 of 2,446,240 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #15,565 of 2,446,240 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes