Does twin earth rest on a mistake?

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169 (2003)
Abstract
In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we can trace conceptual differences to internal differences. If it doesn’t, we do not have a case of conceptual difference. Neither case supports Twin Earth externalism
Keywords Epistemology  Externalism  Psychosemantics  Twin Earth
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DOI croatjphil20033213
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