Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169 (2003)

Authors
Katalin Farkas
Central European University
Abstract
In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we can trace conceptual differences to internal differences. If it doesn’t, we do not have a case of conceptual difference. Neither case supports Twin Earth externalism
Keywords Epistemology  Externalism  Psychosemantics  Twin Earth
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ISBN(s) 1333-1108
DOI croatjphil20033213
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
Is Semantics Possible?Hilary Putnam - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (3):187–201.
The Transparency of Mental Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.

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Citations of this work BETA

Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Quebec: Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.

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Similar books and articles

Semantic Internalism and Externalism.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession.Derek Ball - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
Empty Natural Kind Terms and Dry Earth.Corine Besson - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):403-425.

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