Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag (2019)
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| Abstract |
Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related fields get up to speed on open research-level problems.
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| Keywords | axiom of extensionality |
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| Buy this book | $78.59 new Amazon page |
| ISBN(s) | 978-3-030-03486-3 978-3-030-03487-0 3030034860 9783030034863 |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-030-03487-0 |
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Chapters BETA
Normative Properties and Higher-Order Supervenience
I now move to the hyperintensionality of normative properties. Since there is already work on the topic, I tackle the main objection to this position, namely reductivism, and I argue that a higher-order supervenience principle, together with a hyperintensional account of properties, deflect Jackson-... see more
The Scale of Normative Reasons
Normative notions are often explained in terms of reasons, which can be weighted and combined, for instance in order to know what one ought to do. But what is their weight? How do they combine? This chapter applies measurement theory to these questions. I argue that normative reasons cannot be consi... see more
Reasons: Logic and Hyperintensionality
In this chapter we argue that normative Reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that logically equivalent Propositions may be different reasons for the same thing , and therefore cannot be substituted for each other.
Truthmaker Semantics for Deontic Modals
In this chapter I briefly give a philosophical introduction to truthmaker semantics and I present Fine’s logic and semantics for imperatives, I discuss two philosophical difficulties for Fine’s account and propose some technical solutions.
Deontic Modals are Hyperintensional
I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, that is, logical equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one is deductive and the other abductive. First, I simply prove that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I claim that a hyperintensional theory... see more
Co-hyperintensionality
Co-hyperintensionalityHyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. I argue that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality Propositions fail. I ar... see more
A Primer on Hyperintensionality
In this chapter I bring hyperintensionality in to the picture. In the previous chapter I introduced classical ands non-classical semantics for deontic modals, and suggested some of the problems they have to face are due to their coarseness of grain. Hyperintensionality is one way to get finer-graine... see more
Intensional Logic and Semantics for Deontic Modals
This chapter is a critical introduction to different semantics for deontic modals, in particular semantics given to ‘ought’. After some methodological considerations on the role of semantic and philosophical inquiry on modality and natural language modality , I briefly consider what is now considere... see more
References found in this work BETA
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
View all 530 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
A Hyperintensional Logical Framework for Deontic Reasons.Federico L. G. Faroldi & Tudor Protopopescu - 2019 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4):411-433.
Moral Principles: Hedged, Contributory, Mixed.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems 2020/21.
Axiomatizing Norms Across Time and the 'Paradox of the Court'.Daniela Glavaničová & Matteo Pascucci - 2021 - In Fenrong Liu, Alessandra Marra, Paul Portner & Frederik Van de Putte (eds.), DEON 2020/2021. College Publications. pp. 201-218.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
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