History and Theory 17 (3):285-310 (1978)

Abstract
Though Hume is often considered the hero of analytic philosophy in its positivistic phase, his concept of sympathy can be understood as an eighteenth- century prototype of Verstehen. Sympathy is central to Hume's moral philosophy, as he considered it the source of human motivation, social interaction, evaluation, and understanding. It has been acknowledged that sympathy, for Hume, was the human ability to associate with the sensations and passions of others. However, he also stated that this association was neither feeling nor passion, but a species of communication. This sympathetic communication included not only passions and feelings, but ideas, opinions, and reason. Though somewhat inconsistently, Hume argued that the process of sympathy was hermeneutic rather than causal. Like the concept of Verstehen, sympathy requires a contextual understanding of human relations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2504741
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,133
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Spinozist Aesthetics of Affect and Its Political Implications.Christopher Davidson - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 185-206.
Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.
The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Boros Gábor, Szalai Judit & Toth Oliver Istvan (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology.Rico Vitz - 2004 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.
Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances.Jon Rick - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
Sympathy in the Scottish Enlightenment.Martin G. Leever - 1999 - Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
Hume’s Confusion About Sympathy.Douglas Chismar - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:237-246.
Hume on the Moral Difference Between Humans and Other Animals.Denis G. Arnold - 1995 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (3):303 - 316.
Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination.Mark Collier - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.
Hume's Influence on John Gregory and the History of Medical Ethics.Laurence B. McCullough - 1999 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24 (4):376 – 395.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-02-04

Total views
18 ( #585,770 of 2,448,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #451,050 of 2,448,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes