Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3) (2017)
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Abstract

It is widely agreed that normative properties supervene on natural properties. Non-naturalists face a distinctive challenge to explain this relation. Stephanie Leary argues that non-naturalists can meet this explanatory demand by positing the existence of hybrid normative properties. I argue that this proposal does not meet the supervenience challenge.

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David Faraci
Durham University

References found in this work

Senses of Essence.Kit Fine - 1995 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.), Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-73.
Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism.James Dreier - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):13-38.

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