Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332 (2010)
Authors
David Shoemaker
Tulane University
David Faraci
Durham University
Abstract
Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Developmental Psychology   Epistemology   Neurosciences   Cognitive Psychology   Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,245
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):378-410.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Responsibility and the Brain Sciences.Felipe De Brigard, Eric Mandelbaum & David Ripley - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):511-524.
Insanity and Responsibility.Herbert Fingarette - 1972 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):6 – 29.
Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence.Steve Matthews - 2004 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
The Real Self View.Susan Wolf - 1993 - In J. Fischer M. Ravizza (ed.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press.
The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath.Heidi L. Maibom - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.
Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-03-27

Total downloads
233 ( #19,628 of 2,242,795 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #36,104 of 2,242,795 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature