Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows

Manuscrito 38 (3):5-14 (2015)
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

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Paulo Faria
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

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References found in this work

The Transparency of Mental Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.
Memory and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
Externalism and inference.Paul A. Boghossian - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:11-28.
Boghossian on externalism and inference.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:29-38.
Logical luck.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):319-334.

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