Is There Room for Justified Beliefs without Evidence? A Critical Assessment of Epistemic Evidentialism

Logos and Episteme 7 (2):137-152 (2016)
Abstract
In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be no epistemically justified belief without evidence. However, there are other kinds of justification beyond the epistemic justification, such as prudential or moral justification; therefore, there is room for justified beliefs (in a prudential or moral sense) without evidence.
Keywords evidence  evidentialism  epistemic justification  justification without evidence
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20167215
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