Knowability and the capacity to know

Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73 (2010)
Abstract
This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch's paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch's paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that p even if it is metaphysically impossible for anyone to know that p, and that recognizing this fact provides the resources to solve Fitch's paradox
Keywords Knowability  Capacities  Fitch’s paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9676-8
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Common Ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
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Citations of this work BETA
Ability, Modality, and Genericity.John Maier - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
Knowability as Potential Knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.

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Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox.Samuel Alexander - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.
Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Author unknown - manuscript

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