Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75 (3):1951-1976 (2019)

Authors
Domingos Faria
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.
Keywords consequence argument,  determinism,  free will,  incompatibilism,  rule
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.17990/rpf/2019_75_3_1951
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Consequence Argument and the Definition of Determinism.Christopher Hughes - 2015 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):705-724.
What the Consequence Argument Is an Argument For.Justin A. Capes - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):50-56.
Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.
Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.
Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the Consequence Argument.Leigh C. Vicens - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta.Thomas M. Crisp & Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-184.
Against Libertarianism.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.
What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-10-29

Total views
223 ( #51,443 of 2,518,143 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #29,189 of 2,518,143 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes