Domingos Faria
Universidade de Lisboa
In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have a defeater for any of their metaphysical beliefs, including the belief in metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, those who accept naturalism have a defeater for naturalism; in other words, metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating.
Keywords autoderrotação  naturalism  naturalismo  metaphysics  theism  Plantinga  teísmo  metafísica  self-defeater
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DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n3p361
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References found in this work BETA

Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):327-328.
The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.Omar Mirza - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):78-89.

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