Abstract
Fictional objects like “Hamlet” or “Rostam” pose many problems for Logicians and thinkers theorizing about perception. The problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we think and speak about these objects and, on the other hand, we can’t find them in our world. Two groups are theorizing this issue. Proponents of the first group think that there are not any fictional object; they are just words. The others find these objects indispensable and they work on the ontology of them. The latter thinkers offer different views on the ‘mode of being’ of fictional objects. But these two groups have faced some problems. However, Roman Ingarden sees the main problem in ignoring one of the possible modes of being. He shows that fictional objects are “purely intentional objects” depending first and foremost on conscious acts and also on some physical or ideal object. In this paper, we offer the ideas of the above-mentioned groups and then propose Ingarden’s views.