Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):167-189 (2008)
Here I propose a coherent way of preserving the identity of material objects with the matter that constitutes them. The presentation is formal, and intended for RSL. An informal presentation is in preliminary draft! Relative-sameness relations—such as being the same person as—are like David Lewis's "counterpart" relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold between objects that aren't identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different contexts. They differ from counterpart relations, however, in that they are weak equivalence relations (transitive, symmetric and weakly reflexive). The likenesses to counterpart relations make them suitable for an analysis of de-re temporal and modal predications. The difference renders the resulting counterpart theory immune to standard criticisms of Lewis's Counterpart Theory (e.g., in Hazen 1979, and Fara and Williamson 2005).
|Keywords||counterpart theory contingent identity relative sameness|
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter.Kit Fine - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):195-234.
Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays.Robert Stalnaker - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem.Karen Bennett - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (3):339-371.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Citations of this work BETA
Expressive Power of “Now” and “Then” Operators.Igor Yanovich - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (1):65-93.
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