Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience?

In Berit Brogaard, Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 351-370 (2014)
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Abstract

It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of perception, we can see that at least in two sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform answer to this question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move along the causal chain. Accordingly, the content of olfactory and tactile experience may vary.

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Katalin Farkas
Central European University

Citations of this work

Representation and ephemerality in olfaction.Cain Todd - 2018 - In Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhaill, Perceptual Ephemera. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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Smelling things.Giulia Martina & Matthew Nudds - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):652-670.
Defending (perceptual) attitudes.Valentina Martinis - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):560–576.

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References found in this work

Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.

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