Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience?

In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 351-370 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of perception, we can see that at least in two sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform answer to this question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move along the causal chain. Accordingly, the content of olfactory and tactile experience may vary.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Sniff, smell, and stuff.Vivian Mizrahi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):233-250.
Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
Smelling lessons.Clare Batty - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):161-174.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
Object Perception: Vision and Audition.Casey O’Callaghan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):803-829.
Seeing absence.Anna Farennikova - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):429-454.
How to account for illusion.Bill Brewer - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-180.
Representing the impossible.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.
Independent intentional objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-05

Downloads
1,145 (#9,284)

6 months
190 (#10,859)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katalin Farkas
Central European University

Citations of this work

How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117.
Defending (perceptual) attitudes.Valentina Martinis - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Smelling things.Giulia Martina & Matthew Nudds - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Phenomenology of perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.

View all 17 references / Add more references