Mind 129 (513):225-234 (2020)

Authors
David Faraci
Durham University
Abstract
Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In closing, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his central targets—so-called ‘buck-passing’ views—would remain unclear.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzy054
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.
An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):229-244.
How There Could Be Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):667-680.
Aesthetic Obligations.Robbie Kubala - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (12):1-13.

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