Dissertation, (2012)

Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
The overall objective of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of the standard of correctness of belief. According to this standard, a belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. My analysis consists in the investigation of a set of aspects and properties of the correctness standard of belief. The main point argued in this dissertation is that the correctness standard of belief is a standard of conformity to the satisfaction conditions of a representational function constitutive of belief. Another relevant conclusionreached in my dissertation concerns the appropriate formulation of the standard in an ought-claim. I argued that the proper way of formulating the standard in an ought-claim is: "for any S, p: it ought to be the case that p, given that S believes that p"
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