In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 165-184 (2016)

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Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
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DOI 10.1515/9783110496765-009
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Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.

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