Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166 (2017)

Authors
Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
Abstract
A recent view in contemporary epistemology holds that practical reasoning is governed by an epistemic norm. Evidence for the existence of this norm is provided by the ways in which we assess our actions and reasoning on the basis of whether certain epistemic conditions are satisfied. Philosophers disagree on what this norm is—whether it is knowledge, justified belief or something else. Nobody however challenges the claim that practical reasoning is governed by such a norm. I argue that assuming the existence of an epistemic norm of practical reasoning is neither the only nor the best way to accommodate the available data. I introduce and defend an alternative account that avoids the assumption. According to this account, the relevant epistemic assessments of action and reasoning are instrumental assessments relative to the regulation conditions of a non-epistemic norm.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0792-2
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge and Reasoning.Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10371-10388.
Refined Invariantism.Jacques‐Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.

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