Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870 (2020)

Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
I introduce and defend a view about knowledge that I call Moderate Skeptical Invariantism. According to this view, a subject knows p only if she is practically certain that p, where practical certainty is defined as the confidence a rational subject would have to have for her to believe that p and act on p no matter the stakes. I do not provide a definitive case for this view, but I argue that it has several explanatory advantages over alternative views and I show how it can avoid two pressing problems commonly addressed to similar approaches.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-0053-1
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books.Bob Beddor - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):193-198.
A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Robin McKenna - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.

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