Ratio 32 (1):63-73 (2019)

Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
Benjamin Kiesewetter has recently provided an argument to the effect that necessarily, if one has decisive reason to φ, then one has sufficient reason to believe that she herself has decisive reason to φ. If sound, this argument has important implications for several debates in contemporary normative philosophy. I argue that the main premise in the argument is problematic and should be rejected. According to this premise (PRR), necessarily, one can respond correctly to all the decisive reasons one has. I show that PRR is confronted with counterexamples and presupposes an implausible commensurability of all kinds of reasons. If so, the conclusion in Kiesewetter’s argument doesn’t follow. I also discuss further implications of my objections to PRR for a specific family of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principles and ability constraints on reasons, and the consequences that these could have for a number of contemporary debates in normative philosophy.
Keywords Kiesewetter  normativity  reasons  responding to reasons  ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/rati.12204
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,714
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
The Chinese Rune Argument.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.
What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.
The Harms of Enhancement and the Conclusive Reasons View.Thomas Douglas - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):23-36.
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
Reasons and Normativity in Critical Thinking.Guðmundur Heiðar Frímannsson - 2016 - Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi 4 (1):3-16.
The Bhagavadgītā, Sen, and Anderson.J. M. Fritzman - 2015 - Asian Philosophy 25 (4):319-338.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Weighing Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality?Michael Smith - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
Responding Correctly to Invalid Syllogism Problems-the 4 Fundamental Facts.M. Levine & M. Cassidy - 1992 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (6):444-444.
Repression and External Reasons.Gary Jaeger - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):433--446.


Added to PP index

Total views
44 ( #248,102 of 2,462,724 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #144,374 of 2,462,724 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes