A Virtue Theory of Testimony

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):189-211 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper aims to outline, evaluate, and ultimately reject a virtue epistemic theory of testimony before proposing a virtue ethical theory. Trust and trustworthiness, it is proposed, are ethical virtues; and from these ethical virtues, epistemic consequences follow

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Paul Faulkner
University of Sheffield