Can Religious Arguments "Persuade"?

Abstract
In his famous essay "The Ethics of Belief," William K. Clifford claimed "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." ). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford's Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade . In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call "begging the doxastic question." An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument's conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments
Keywords Ethics of belief  Religious argument  Persuasion  Question-begging  Evidentialism  agnosticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-007-9141-x
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
The Web of Belief.W. V. Quine - 1970 - New York: Random House.
Are Circular Arguments Necessarily Vicious?Douglas N. Walton - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):263-274.
The Nature of Thought.B. Blanshard - 1938 - George Allen and Unwin.

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Socrates’ Warning Against Misology.Thomas Miller - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (2):145-179.

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