David Hume's reductionist epistemology of testimony

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313 (1998)
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Abstract

David Hume advances a reductionist epistemology of testimony: testimonial beliefs are justified on the basis of beliefs formed from other sources. This reduction, however, has been misunderstood. Testimonial beliefs are not justified in a manner identical to ordinary empirical beliefs; it is true, they are justified by observation of the conjunction between testimony and its truth, it is the nature of the conjunctions that has been misunderstood. The observation of these conjunctions provides us with our knowledge of human nature and it is this knowledge which justifies our testimonial beliefs. Hume gives a naturalistic rather than sceptical account of testimony.

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Paul Faulkner
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What Is Wrong with Lying?Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
Hume on Testimony Revisited.Axel Gelfert - 2010 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 13 (1):60-75.

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References found in this work

Testimony and memory.Michael Dummett - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 251--272.
Hume and Julius Caesar.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1973 - Analysis 34 (1):1 - 7.

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