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Knowledge on Trust
New York: Oxford University Press (2011)
Abstract
Paul Faulkner presents a new theory of testimony - the basis of much of what we know. He addresses the questions of what makes it reasonable to accept a piece of testimony, and what warrants belief formed on that basis. He rejects rival theories and argues that testimonial knowledge and testimonially warranted belief are based on trust.Author's Profile
Reprint years
2014
Call number
BD161.F29 2011
ISBN(s)
9780199589784 019958978X 0198709331 9780191725517 9780198709336
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Chapters
The Epistemology of Testimony
An epistemological theory of testimony provides an account of how we acquire knowledge and warranted belief from testimony. This chapter presents an overview of the main theoretical positions, introduces the problem of cooperation that any theory of testimony must address, and states the k... see more
The Reductive Theory
According to the reductive theory of testimony, an audience must possess reasons for testimonial uptake. And testimonial knowledge and warrant are inductive in nature. This chapter considers how the reductive theory can respond to the problem that we have a limited ability to observe the t... see more
Trust and the Transmission of Knowledge
This chapter argues that the reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, it gives an overly restrictive account of when the uptake of testimony is warranted. Consequently, it can only provide a sceptical solution to the problem of cooperation. Second, it is wrong to draw no ... see more
The Non-Reductive Theory
According to the non-reductive theory of testimony, an audience is entitled to believe testimony, other things being equal. And testimony is distinctive as an epistemic source in that it transmits knowledge and warrant. This chapter outlines four arguments for an entitlement to believe tes... see more
Trust and the Uptake of Testimony
This chapter argues that the non-reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong descriptively. Either it wrongly takes gullibly formed beliefs to be warranted, or it wrongly takes beliefs formed on trus... see more
The Assurance Theory
This chapter presents the assurance theory of testimony developed by Richard Moran. It argues that this theory faces a dilemma: in order to receive a speaker’s assurance, an audience must trust, but our warrant for trust seems to come either from a non-reductive entitlement or be reductive... see more
Trust and the Institution of Testimony
It is possible to treat a single piece of testimony both as offering a speaker’s assurance and as providing a bit of evidence. This chapter considers how this is possible through an examination of Bernard Williams’s genealogical explanation of our valuing the disposition of Sincerity. This... see more
The Trust Theory
This chapter draws together the conclusions of previous chapters to present the trust theory of testimony. According to this theory, one needs to possess reasons to be warranted in testimonial uptake, but it is reasons one does not possess that warrant one’s testimonial beliefs. Simply put... see more
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Can Trust Itself Ground a Reason to Believe the Trusted?Edward Hinchman - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (S6):47-83.
Testimony, testimonial belief, and safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
I can trust you now … but not later: An explanation of testimonial knowledge in children.Joshue Orozco - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):195-214.
Kant on testimony.Axel Gelfert - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (4):627 – 652.
A defense of reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs.Tomoji Shogenji - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
Epistemic authority, testimony and the transmission of knowledge†.Arnon Keren - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):368-381.
The social character of testimonial knowledge.Paul Faulkner - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):581-601.
David Hume's reductionist epistemology of testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
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Citations of this work
Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.
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