On Dreaming and Being Lied To

Episteme 2 (3):149-159 (2006)

Authors
Paul Faulkner
University of Sheffield
Abstract
As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfi ed in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has substantial implications for any non-sceptical epistemological theory of testimony
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.149
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

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Citations of this work BETA

Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.

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