Episteme 2 (3):149-159 (2005)
As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfi ed in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has substantial implications for any non-sceptical epistemological theory of testimony
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
What is Wrong with Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge.Paul Faulkner - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):581-601.
Conspiracies And Lyes: Scepticism And The Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Dissertation, University College London
David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - In Östman & Verschueren (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. John Benjamins.
Added to index2010-07-11
Total downloads43 ( #119,854 of 2,163,570 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,040 of 2,163,570 )
How can I increase my downloads?