On Telling and Trusting

Mind 116 (464):875-902 (2007)

Authors
Paul Faulkner
University of Sheffield
Abstract
A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to be truthful and demonstrate certain reactive attitudes if they are not. Trust and the accompanying willingness to these reactive attitudes can then provide speakers with a reason to be trustworthy. So through ignoring interlocutors' engagement with the communicative process, the existing debate misses the possibility that it is an audience's trusting a speaker that makes it reasonable for the audience to accept what the speaker says
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzm875
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References found in this work BETA

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Trust and Antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
Getting Told and Being Believed.Richard A. Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
What Is Trust?Thomas W. Simpson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):550-569.

View all 44 citations / Add more citations

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What Is Wrong with Lying.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
Getting Told and Being Believed.Richard A. Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.
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A Genealogy of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):305-321.

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