International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):259 – 269 (2004)
We depend upon the community for justified belief in scientific theory. This dependence can suggest that our individual belief in scientific theory is justified because the community believes it to be justified. This idea is at the heart of an anti-realist epistemology according to which there are no facts about justification that transcend a community's judgement thereof. Ultimately, knowledge and justified belief are simply social statuses. When conjoined with the lemma that communities can differ in what they accept as justified, epistemological anti-realism entails epistemological relativism. Further, this lemma can also be used to generate an argument for relativism and, thereby, for anti-realism. So if an epistemologically realist account of our justification for belief in scientific theory is to be given, then it must be possible, first, to defend a realist interpretation of the idea that individual belief can be community-justified and second, to defend it in a way that is compatible with the fact of possible community diversity. This paper tries to meet these challenges.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.
Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge.Barry Barnes & David Bloor - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Is Science Like a Crossword Puzzle? Foundherentist Conceptions of Scientific Warrant.Rik Peels - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):82-101.
Similar books and articles
Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy.Marc Lange - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):281–285.
Is Everything Relative? Anti-Realism, Truth and Feminism.Mari Mikkola - 2010 - In A. Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Scientific Realism, Perceptual Beliefs, and Justification.Richard Otte - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:393 - 404.
A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.Richard Foley - manuscript
Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation.Gregory W. Dawes - 2013 - Ratio 26 (1):62-78.
The Basic Notion of Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
Non‐Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks.Michela Massimi - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (1):36-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #113,792 of 2,172,870 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #117,033 of 2,172,870 )
How can I increase my downloads?