Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):581-601 (2000)
Through communication, we form beliefs about the world, its history, others and ourselves. A vast proportion of these beliefs we count as knowledge. We seem to possess this knowledge only because it has been communicated. If those justifications that depended on communication were outlawed, all that would remain would be body of illsupported prejudice. The recognition of our ineradicable dependence on testimony for much of what we take ourselves to know has suggested to many that an epistemological account of testimony should be essentially similar to accounts of perception and memory. This premise I want to dispute.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.Kristie Dotson - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (2):236-257.
Belief-Forming Processes, Extended.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
Similar books and articles
I Can Trust You Now … but Not Later: An Explanation of Testimonial Knowledge in Children.Joshue Orozco - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):195-214.
Conspiracies And Lyes: Scepticism And The Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Dissertation, University College London
David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - In Östman & Verschueren (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. John Benjamins.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads128 ( #36,869 of 2,158,277 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #27,551 of 2,158,277 )
How can I increase my downloads?