Understanding knowledge transmission

Ratio 19 (2):156–175 (2006)
Authors
Paul Faulkner
University of Sheffield
Abstract
We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to decide what is at issue between these explanations.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00317.x
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton University Press.
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth.Richard Rorty - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
The Seas of Language.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Circular Testimony.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2029-2048.

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