The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124 (2016)
Authors
Peter Fazekas
University of Antwerp
Abstract
The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for physicalist accounts of consciousness. In recent years, defenders of physicalism have typically been relying on the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy to avoid dualism. In this paper, we argue with PCS that cognitive-physicalistic explanations can account for the peculiarities of phenomenal character. However, we think that the conceptual features PCS investigates are not the genuine causes of the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only symptoms, which can themselves be explained in terms of the features of the sensory-perceptual representations underlying conscious experiences, namely that some, but not all, of these states are representationally unstructured.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0599-6
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Image and Mind.Stephen M. Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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