How Much Do Thoughts Count?: Preference for Emotion versus Principle in Judgments of Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior

Emotion Review 3 (3):316-317 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Following important work by Pizarro, Uhlmann and Salovey (2003) on moral judgments of uncontrolled/impulsive versus controlled/ deliberate action, we focus on the related issue of the moral evaluation of emotion-motivated versus principle-driven behavior. We examine: (a) the potential lesser blameworthiness of antisocial acts perceived as driven by emotion as opposed to principle; (b) how factors governing the moral evaluation of antisocial acts might extend to the evaluation of prosocial acts; and (c) how overriding a moral emotion in favor of a moral principle affects moral attributions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-23

Downloads
35 (#445,257)

6 months
6 (#504,917)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?