Progress in psychology

In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. New York: Routledge. pp. 184-203 (2022)
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Abstract

The chapter argues that whereas traditional accounts of progress have typically focused on scientific theories (evaluating them with regards to their truthlikeness or their explanatory and predictive success), we should pay closer attention to efforts of forming and developing scientific concepts (evaluating them with regards to how well such concepts serve the respective aims of research, which can include, but are not limited to, explanation and prediction). If we focus on concepts rather than theories, our attention is drawn to the questions of (a) what is the status of the subject matter of psychological research and (b) what are basic requirements for conceptual progress with regards to this subject matter.

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Uljana Feest
Universität Hannover

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What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis of?Uljana Feest - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.

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