Kreativität im Denken. Eine Kritik des Reliabilitätsarguments von John D. Norton gegen rationalistische Epistemologien zur Methode des Gedankenexperiments

In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin (2005)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Norton's case against Brown's rationalism about thought experiments suffers from serious shortcomings, which relate to the nature of induction.
Keywords Thought Experiments  Rationalism  Induction  Inference to the best explanation
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