Utilitas 28 (2):136-163 (2016)

Authors
Neil Feit
Fredonia State University
Abstract
Given that a person's death is bad for her, when is it bad? I defend subsequentism, the view that things that are bad in the relevant way are bad after they occur. Some have objected to this view on the grounds that it requires us to compare the amount of well-being the victim would have enjoyed, had she not died, with the amount she receives while dead; however, we cannot assign any level of well-being, not even zero, to a dead person. In the population ethics literature, many philosophers have argued along similar lines that bringing someone into existence can neither harm nor benefit her. Working within the comparative framework, I respond by proposing a good sense in which we can say that dead people, and actual people at alternatives in which they do not exist, have a well-being level of zero
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820815000308
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Actualism and Thisness.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):3-41.
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When Good Things Happen to Harmed People.Molly Gardner - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):893-908.

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