Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457 (2006)

Neil Feit
Fredonia State University
I present two short arguments concerning the views named in the title. First, I argue that the Doctrine of Propositions, according to which the contents of our psychological attitudes are always propositions, is incompatible with Internalism, understood as a doctrine endorsing the intrinsic character of mental content. Second, I try to show that the Doctrine of Propositions is also incompatible with the claim that psychological properties supervene globally on physical properties (i.e., that there can be no mental difference without some physical difference). The upshot is that the Doctrine of Propositions is inconsistent with each of two important supervenience principles.
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Global  Internalism  Proposition  Self-knowledge  Supervenience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-0016-z
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,231
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2013 - In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 105-31.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong.Mark Moyer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):125 - 150.
Global Supervenience and Dependence.Karen Bennett - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.
Varieties of Supervenience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1994 - In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Savellos, E.; Yalchin, O. (Eds.) Supervenience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--59.
'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited.Jaegwon Kim - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.


Added to PP index

Total views
48 ( #237,817 of 2,518,494 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #408,186 of 2,518,494 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes