When does falsehood preclude knowledge?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304 (2011)
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Abstract

Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology

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Author Profiles

Neil Feit
Fredonia State University
Andy Cullison
DePauw University

Citations of this work

Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.
Knowledge despite falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.

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References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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