Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 (1):1-8 (2018)

Authors
Tomer Fekete
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Abstract
A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.
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References found in this work BETA

The Information Integration Theory of Consciousness.Giulio Tononi - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 287--299.
Is Perception Discrete or Continuous?Rufin VanRullen & Christof Koch - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):207-213.

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