Authors
Tomer Fekete
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Abstract
A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious will do so for some – perhaps most – of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems (e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of consciousness.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 231.
Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought.Peter Gärdenfors - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):180-181.
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Identity, Immortality, Happiness: Pick Two.Shimon Edelman - 2018 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 28 (1):1-17.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The (Lack of) Mental Life of Some Machines.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins.. pp. 88--95.
Computationalism and the Problem of Other Minds.Stuart M. Glennan - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-388.
Computationalism and the Problem of Other Minds.Stuart S. Glennan - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-88.
Stinking Consciousness!Benjamin D. Young - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):223-243.
Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience.Jesse J. Prinz - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):111-132.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-06-30

Total views
250 ( #39,766 of 2,455,352 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #44,759 of 2,455,352 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes