Synthese 197 (4):1543-1563 (2020)

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Abstract
There are several proposals to resolve the problem of epistemic peer disagreement which concentrate on the question of how to incorporate evidence of such a disagreement. The main positions in this field are the equal weight view, the steadfast view, and the total evidence view. In this paper we present a new argument in favour of the equal weight view. As we will show, this view results from a general approach of forming epistemic attitudes in an optimal way. By this, the argument for equal weighting can be massively strengthened from reasoning via epistemic indifference to reasoning from optimality.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02028-1
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.

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