Clifford's principle and James's options

Social Epistemology 20 (1):19 – 33 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper I discuss William J. Clifford's principle, "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" and an objection to it based on William James's contention that "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds." I argue that on one central way of understanding the key terms, there are no genuine options that cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. I also argue that there is another way to understand the terms so that there are cases of the sort James describes, but then, as an objection to Clifford, the argument is needlessly complex, invoking concepts such as genuine options and intellectual undecidability, that play no crucial role.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02691720600631645
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,711
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1879 - In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
The Will to Believe.James William - 1896 - New York: Longmans, Green and Co..

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Holding the Faith True.John Zeis - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):161-170.
Evidentialism Versus Faith.John Zeis - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (1):1 – 13.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

181 ( #23,290 of 2,146,251 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #56,436 of 2,146,251 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums