Episteme 6 (3):294-312 (2009)
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Abstract |
Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and that there are no true general principles about justified responses to disagreement other than the general evidentialist principle. I then argue that the puzzles about disagreement are primarily puzzles about the evidential impact of higher - order evidence – evidence about the significance or existence of ordinary, or first- order, evidence. I conclude by arguing that such higher - order evidence can often have a profound effect on the justification of first- order beliefs
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Keywords | higher-order doubts or evidence |
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DOI | 10.3366/e1742360009000720 |
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reasonable Religious Disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Louise Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-214.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.
Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.
View all 62 citations / Add more citations
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
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